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 ASSESSING THE ALLOCATION OF ITALIAN FOREIGN AID 
 
by Claudia Maurini* and Riccardo Settimo* 
 
Abstract 
  This paper provides an assessment of Italian aid policy during the period 1983-
2006. In comparison with other donors (DAC and G-7), the main stylized facts are: 
persistently lower aid/GDP ratio, greater recourse to multilateral channels, a higher 
percentage of “tied” flows and relatively greater recourse to debt relief. Drawing on the 
empirical literature on aid allocation, we estimate the determinants of Italy’s bilateral 
aid. We use three groups of explanatory variables, reflecting national-interest, 
humanitarian and selectivity-related motivations. We find that the distribution of Italian 
bilateral resources is significantly affected by both national-interest (like foreign policy 
or trade) and humanitarian motives, related to recipients’ needs; the latter’s role, in 
particular, seems to have strengthened over time. There is ample room for improving 
selectivity, i.e., the capacity to direct ODA flows to “deserving” countries, where better 
policies and institutions are likely to increase aid effectiveness. 
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Introduction 
In recent years donor countries have striven – with limited success – to 
honour the aid commitments made in Monterrey (2002) and Glenagles (2005). 
Aid from the DAC countries actually declined in 2006 and 2007, weakening 
the chances of achieving the promised $ 50 billion increase between 2004 and 
2010, with 50 percent of the increase destined for Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Against this backdrop, the issue of aid allocation and effectiveness has 
naturally become central. Given the difficulty of scaling-up aid volumes, 
donors and multilateral development institutions have focused increasingly on 
how to make aid more effective in fostering economic growth and reducing 
poverty in developing countries. 
Yet, poverty reduction is not the only reason for foreign aid. 
Geopolitical or trade interests and colonial ties play a significant, and in some 
cases even predominant, role. The long-standing theoretical dispute on 
“altruistic” vs. “egoistic” objectives is now reconciled in the view that both 
kinds of factor need to be considered in empirical models of aid allocation. 
Here we analyse the aid policy pursued by Italy in the period 1983-
2006. The paper is organized as follows. Section I provides a descriptive 
overview of total Italian aid trends and identifies the major stylized facts. 
Section II briefly reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on the 
determinants of bilateral aid allocation and its effectiveness. Drawing on this 
literature, we estimate the motivations of Italian bilateral aid and test for 
policy changes over time. Data and methodologies are presented in Section III, 
and Section IV features the main results. Section V concludes.   6
I. Italian aid: main trends and stylized facts 
Italy plays a major role in development cooperation, though decreasing 
in recent years. On average, Italy’s net Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) flows were $ 3.7 billion a year in the period 2004-06, about 3.8 percent 
of OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) aggregate. Though 
considerable in absolute terms (the eighth largest donor in 2006), our 
contribution has been diminished significantly, especially during the 1990s, 
and is now around 10 percent lower than in 1990 (fig.1). 
According to many, the global decline in ODA during the nineties is 
largely attributable to the general review of development policies that 
followed the end of the Cold War. In the case of Italy, the reduction was both 
sharper and longer-lasting, due to at least four additional country-specific 
factors: (i) the currency crisis of 1992, (ii) a collapse of public confidence in 
ODA during the political upheavals and corruption turmoil of the early 1990s, 
(iii) the budget austerity required to join the European monetary union and (iv) 
the country’s prolonged failure to approve long-awaited development 
cooperation reforms. As a result, in the last decade Italy recorded ODA/GDP 
ratios persistently lower (by 0.10 percentage points) than the DAC average 
(fig.2). 
Given these premises, it will be particularly challenging for Italy to 
honour the pledges of aid scale-up made at Monterrey (ODA/GDP at 0.7 
percent by 2015). According to a recent DAC Secretariat simulation, 
achieving the intermediate target of 0.51 percent of GDP by 2010 (announced 
at Gleneagles) means almost tripling the amount of resources allocated in 
2007. 
We now proceed with a brief descriptive exploration of the data in the 
24 years covered by our subsequent econometric analysis, bringing out some 
stylized facts in the composition of Italian ODA, and compare it with other   7
donors. In what follows the data are for disbursements rather than 
commitments, because they better reflect the actual transfer of resources. 
Historically, Italian development cooperation is characterised by a 
relatively modest resort to the bilateral channel. As is evident from fig.3, the 
percentage of aid delivered directly to beneficiaries has always been lower 
than the DAC and G7 average, and the gap has widened over time. Preference 
for multilateral institutions (like the World Bank or the IMF) is consistent with 
the long-standing deficiencies, both strategic and operational, of the DCGS
1, 
as the DAC has noted repeatedly (see OECD 1996, 2000 and 2004). 
Another distinctive feature of Italian development assistance, in recent 
years, has been the high percentage of aid consisting in debt relief. On 
average, during the period 1999-2006, this accounted for over 18 percent of 
total bilateral aid, against 10 percent for DAC countries as a whole (fig.4). The 
higher incidence of debt relief is consistent with Italy’s budget difficulties, 
given that debt cancellation does not require the commitment of new 
resources. Obviously, this implies further challenges in the future, when the 
progressive fading-out of large-scale international debt relief initiatives will 
make it harder for Italy to honour its scale-up pledges.  
A look at “tied aid”, as a percentage of total bilateral resources, gives a 
preliminary idea on the importance of the national interest in Italian aid 
allocation. On average, for Italy, such transfers have held stable at around 45 
per cent of total bilateral flows, while for other donors their incidence is 
smaller and has been decreasing over time (fig.5). 
On the positive side, Italy allocates a higher percentage of aid to the 
neediest countries (fig.6). However, support for human development projects 
should be increased, as a lower-than-average percentage of aid goes to 
education, health and other types of social spending (fig.7). 
                                                 
1 Direzione Generale per la Cooperazione allo Sviluppo: the Foreign Ministry department in 
charge of managing bilateral aid flows.   8
Finally, in Italy’s case the incidence of administrative costs is low
2 
(fig.8). However, these data should be interpreted with great caution, given the 
considerable international differences in administrative structures. A lower 
incidence of costs, for instance, is not necessarily an indicator of efficiency in 
disbursing aid or, conversely, of understaffing. The Italian data reflect a 
number of country-specific factors, such as: (i) the high share of multilateral 
contributions, which are less labour-intensive than most bilateral programmes; 
(ii) frequent resort to outsourcing, in which case administrative costs are part 
of program budgets; (iii) a relatively modest involvement in technical 
assistance, which is usually labour-intensive; (iv) the modalities of cost 
reporting, as the ODA budget forms part of many different government 
departments, whose expenses may not all be included in the data collected by 
the DAC. 
                                                 
2 Those not already included in project budgets.   9
II. The literature on foreign aid: effectiveness versus determinants 
Since the early 1970s, there have been two main strands in the 
literature on development assistance: one assesses aid effectiveness with 
respect to its official goal (poverty reduction); the other explores the actual 
motivations of foreign aid, analysing the ex-post geographical allocations by 
donors. The first group of studies attempts to answer the question “Does aid 
help fostering recipient countries’ growth?”; the second addresses the question 
“Which donor gives to which recipients and why?”. 
As noted by the World Bank (1998), “Foreign aid has at times been a 
spectacular success and an unmitigated failure”. Consistent with this 
observation, work on the impact of aid on growth and poverty in recipient 
countries has reached contrasting conclusions. The earlier literature found no 
significant effects of foreign assistance on investment and growth in 
developing economies – see Jepma (1997) for a survey – but more recent 
research has shown that recipient countries’ needs (e.g. poverty level) and 
merits (quality of economic policies and institutional context) are necessary 
preconditions for successful aid (Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Collier and 
Dollar 2002). Boone (1994) links aid impact of aid to the political regimes of 
recipient countries. In other words, aid is effective, but only under specific 
favourable circumstances. 
These findings paved the way for a new generation of studies designed 
to assess aid “selectivity”. This concept, bearing on “quality” rather than 
quantity, refers to the ability of a donor country to identify good borrowers 
that can maximize the effectiveness of the aid received (see Dollar and Levine, 
2004). For a review of this literature, as well as for some criticism of Burnside 
and Dollar’s approach, see Amprou et al. (2007).  
The literature on aid determinants comprises both theoretical and 
empirical studies. Papers also differ in their approach, which can be   10
descriptive or normative, as well as in the set of explanatory variables
3. On the 
choice of variables, there was an early clash between those sustaining an 
altruistic view (donors help for humanitarian reasons) and those taking an 
egoistic view (donors allocate aid according to their commercial or political 
interest) (Dudley and Montmarquette,1976; McKinlay and Little, 1977). But 
recent empirical works have overcome this split, allowing for both motivations 
to influence ODA allocation, together with other variables, in “hybrid” 
models. 
Alesina and Dollar (2000) concentrate on bilateral aid from different 
donors, averaging flows over five-year periods from 1970 to 1994. They factor 
in the beneficiary countries’ per capita income, the quality of their institutions 
and policies, and variables capturing the strategic interests of donors
4, 
including colonial links. They find that the most important factors explaining 
aid allocation are colonial past and political alliances. 
Berthélemy and Tichit (2004) focus on the change in donor behaviour 
over time and conclude that colonial bias has weakened since the end of the 
Cold War in favour of commercial factors and reward for sound economic 
policies (since 1990). 
Canavire et al. (2005) compare the determinants of multilateral 
bilateral aid, for nine major donors. Unlike Dollar and Levine (2004), they do 
not find that multilateral aid is better targeted (i.e., directed  predominantly to 
poor countries with good governance); overall, they conclude that the 
distribution of aid still leaves much to be desired, owing to its dependence on 
the commercial and political interests of the donor countries. 
Berthélemy (2006) uses a very large three-dimensional panel dataset 
(donor, recipient, time) to estimate a two-step model that accounts for the 
decision on which country to give to (the first step: a Probit model), and how 
                                                 
3 For a clear taxonomy of studies on aid determinants see Mc Gillivray and White (1993) and 
Mc Gillivray (2004). 
4 They build a “friendship” variable to assess the strategic interest of donors, using the 
correlation between donor’s and recipient’s voting pattern in the UN General Assembly.   11
much (the second step: a linear model based only on strictly positive 
observations)
5. More normatively, he seeks to compare donors by degree of 
altruism in aid allocation, finding that most donors, including Italy, behave in 
a self-interested way. 
We contribute to this literature by studying the determinants of Italian 
foreign aid; to this end we introduce a variable designed to capture Italy’s self-
interested motives for aid. Then, building on the findings of Burnside and 
Dollar (2000) and Collier and Dollar (2002), on aid selectivity, we also try to 
derive some conclusions on the effectiveness of Italian development 
assistance. 
                                                 
5 See Berthélemy (2006) for a useful explanation of the methodological issues involved in 
censored variables and a description of an alternative model for treating them.    12
III. Methodology and data 
We intend to explain the motivations for Italian aid as revealed by the 
ex-post allocation of resources to a cross section of recipient countries. Our 
dataset covers annual bilateral ODA flows from Italy to 156 recipient 
countries over 24 years (1983-2006), as reported by the OECD Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC).
6 In principle, two alternative measures of ODA 
can be used: commitments or disbursements. Our choice is net disbursements, 
which more accurately reflect actual resource transfers (Canavire et al., 2005). 
Given the presence of a number of observations at the value of zero aid, we 
opt for a Tobit modelling framework, to avoid the selection bias linked to the 
censored nature of our dependent variable. In a few cases, net flows were 
negative, due to reimbursements being larger than concessions; here ODA was 
constrained to be equal to zero. 
Ideally, we would want panel estimates, which remove unobserved 
cross-country heterogeneity by simply introducing fixed effects. 
Unfortunately, this approach is unattractive in non-linear models because of 
the incidental parameters' problem. Basically, the problem is that the estimator 
of each fixed effect uses only information from the corresponding group. 
When the number of observations for each country is limited and small (as it is 
the case in our panel) the variance of the estimator of both the intercepts and 
the slope does not converge asymptotically to 0 (see, for instance, Greene 
2004). 
For this reason, we decided instead to work with country averages and 
remove cross-country heterogeneity by including a wide array of explanatory 
variables. In particular, we chose to average annual data and reduced the time 
dimension by splitting the sample into three eight-years periods, 1983-1990, 
1991-1998 and 1999-2006. Years 1991 and 1999 were chosen as watersheds, 
the former as the first after the Cold War period, the latter because of  the 
                                                 
6 See Table 4 for data description.   13
Parliament’s approval of a statement that made poverty reduction a central 
priority of Italian development cooperation (OECD, 2000). Comparing the 
results for the three sub-periods, which contain only cross-sectional data, also 
allows us to test for actual changes in allocation behaviour over time. Table 1 
reports the top aid recipients of Italian ODA in each period. 
Another reason why we decided to work with averages is that we do 
not have a balanced panel, due to lack of yearly data for some variables (for 
instance, data on life expectancy are not updated yearly and the series for 
developing countries typically have a number of missing values). Moreover, 
some of our explanatory variables do not change over time, and most of the 
others present little variability within each eight-year sub-period. 
Finally, averages help to smooth Italy’s erratic ODA flows to many 
recipients, mainly because of the lack of a clear development policy and the 
complexity and unpredictability of aid decision making (OECD, 2004). 
For each of our three sub-periods, average annual aid to the i
th 
beneficiary is specified as the higher between zero and a linear function of the 
set of explanatory variables X, in order to assure that predicted flows cannot 
become negative. 
() 0 , max i i i Aid ε β + Χ =  
Following McGillivray and Oczkowski (1992), we employ the log of 
total and not per-capita ODA, in the belief that a donor country makes its 
policy choice on a country rather than per-capita basis
7. In order to neutralize 
the effect of inflation, aid flows are in constant 2005 USD. 
We chose explanatory variables to capture both the interests of donors 
and the needs/merits of recipients, in line with the assumptions of the recent 
literature that development aid cannot be entirely explained by only one 
category of factors. 
                                                 
7 For a different view, see Berthelemy and Tichit (2004).                                                          14
As to the self-interested objectives, many observers have stressed the 
role of geopolitical factors in aid allocation. Political alliances at the United 
Nations (Alesina and Dollar, 2000) and colonial past have been used 
extensively as explanatory variables, with considerable statistical success. But, 
applying this framework to Italy would be of little help given the absence of 
strong geopolitical interests and of a noteworthy colonial past. 
Instead, we use a proxy of foreign policy interests as discernible from 
official documents and statements. In particular, since the end of the Cold 
War, Italy has sought to strengthen political and economic ties with the 
Mediterranean, Southeast Europe, the Middle East and the Horn of Africa. 
Apart from economic interests, the other factors helping to determine these 
priorities are security, the need to control illegal immigration, cultural 
proximity, the presence of Italians and historical ties (see Appendix I). So, we 
believe that in the case of Italy a dummy variable (ITAFPOL) to pick out 
recipient countries in these regions is more appropriate than colonial past or 
UN voting
8. 
ODA flows might be used also to promote trade with the recipient 
countries. Trade motives may be measured in any number of ways. 
Berthelémy and Tichit (2004) use bilateral trade (exports + imports) as a 
percentage of the donor’s GDP; Berthelémy (2006) uses bilateral exports only. 
We take this latter approach (LNEXP), but scale bilateral exports by total 
exports to recipient countries, not donor GDP. An important caveat is needed 
here: a simultaneity bias might arise in the case of tied aid, when grants entail 
more imports from the donor. 
We turn now to poverty alleviation, which is after all the official 
purpose of ODA. Following the selectivity concept, if donors want to 
maximise the impact of aid on poverty they should direct resources to 
                                                 
8 The dummy ITAFPOL is equal to 1 for the following recipients. Mediterranean: Algeria, 
Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia. Middle East: Jordan, Palestinian adm. areas, Lebanon and 
Syria.  Horn of Africa: Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia. Southeast Europe: Albania, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Serbia. See Appendix I for a detailed description.   15
countries that are not only among the neediest ones, but also have sound 
institutional contexts and good economic policies. As to the needs of 
recipients, we use the log of GDP per capita (LNINC) in PPP terms (constant 
2000 international USD), as reported by the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators (WDI), and an indicator of life expectancy at birth 
(LNLIFEXP), as reported by the same WDI. 
For the quality of institutions, we use the civil liberty index produced 
by Freedom House – which ranges from 1 (top) to 7 (bottom) – and covers a 
sufficiently large number of countries and years
9. Following Berthelémy 
(2006) we regroup countries into two categories and create a dummy variable 
(DCL) equal to 1 for countries with an index up to 4, and 0 for those with 5-7. 
As to quality of policies, we follow the same author and gauge it by aid 
granted by multilateral donors as an indirect proxy (LNMULT). This is in line 
with the idea of the “superiority” of multilateral aid (with respect to bilateral 
flows), since, at least in theory, it should be allocated to countries that conduct 
good policies (Burnside and Dollar, 2000). 
We also add a final group of control variables: geographical distance of 
the recipient from Italy (LNDIST), aggregate bilateral aid from other DAC 
donors (LNDAC)
10 and beneficiary’s population (LNPOP). 
All variables, excluding the two dummies (ITAFPOL and DCL), are in 
logarithms. 
                                                 
9 The Freedom in the World survey provides an annual evaluation of the state of global 
freedom as experienced by individuals. The survey measures freedom—the opportunity to act 
spontaneously in a variety of fields outside the control of the government and other centers of 
potential domination—according to two broad dimensions: political rights and civil liberties. 
Political rights enable people to participate freely in the political process, including the right to 
vote freely for distinct alternatives in legitimate elections, compete for public office, join 
political parties and organizations, and elect representatives who have a decisive impact on 
public policies and are accountable to the electorate. Civil liberties allow for the freedoms of 
expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal 
autonomy without interference from the state. 
10 In addition, this would test for the inclination to act in conformity with fellow donors, a sort 
of international ‘band-wagon’ effect. As Trumbull and Wall (1994) observe, “donors do make 
their decisions with knowledge of what the others are doing, and may act cooperatively”.   16
IV. Results 
The estimation outcomes by sub-period are reported in table 2. We 
separate the explanatory variables into three conceptual groups, associated 
respectively with self-interested (ITAFPOL, LNEXP), humanitarian (LNINC, 
LNLIFEXP) and governance-related (DCL, LNMULT) motivations. Columns 
(a), (b) and (c) give the estimates obtained by regressing aid on each group of 
variables individually plus the controls. Column (d) reports the results of 
regressions that include the whole set of explanatory variables. 
In line with the results of most empirical works, self-interest matters 
for Italian aid. As for other major bilateral donors, trade interests are 
correlated with ODA allocations; when the full set of explanatory variables is 
included, the exports variable (LNEXP) is significant in all periods. The 
dummy ITAFPOL, which identifies “strategic” countries by explicit foreign 
policy lines, is strongly significant in the intermediate period (1991-98). The 
lack of explanatory power pre-1990 is consistent with national interests being 
presumably steered by Cold-War schemes, whereas from 1999 on, foreign 
policy objectives may have been obscured by the growing importance of 
humanitarian factors (see below). 
As to recipients’ needs, income per capita (LNINC) explains aid flows 
in the first period and and life expectancy (LNLIFEXP) in the second; these 
variables both become strongly significant after 1999, providing some 
evidence in favour of the shift towards poverty reduction, officially declared 
by our development policy authorities in that year. This is also consistent with 
the claim made by all major donors that aid has increasingly privileged poor 
and deserving countries in recent years
11.  
On the governance side we find that on average in the last 24 years, 
Italian aid decisions have not taken into account the quality of institutions and 
policies. As an alternative to the civil liberty index, we also considered the 
                                                 
11 See Nunnenkamp and Thiele (2006) for an opposing view.   17
Freedom House political rights index as a measure of institutional quality. The 
results are unchanged.  
Finally, some brief comments on the controls. First, aid granted by 
other bilateral donors is always positively and significantly correlated with 
Italian aid; this is consistent with Italy’s traditional alignment the international 
community and the major European donors. Second, the coefficient of 
population (LNPOP) becomes negative and significant in the last period, 
suggesting a “small-country bias”, that directs more aid per capita to small 
then to large countries. 
   18
Conclusions 
A number of stylized facts concerning Italy’s ODA flows emerge in 
comparison with other donors, namely: (i) persistently lower ODA/GDP ratio, 
(ii) a higher share of debt relief in total aid flows, (iii) a higher percentage of 
“tied” aid and (iv) more intense recourse to multilateral channels. 
  On fact (i), this may be attributed to country-specific political and 
economic circumstances in the 1990s. However, now it is time to honour the 
aid pledges made in Monterrey (2002) and Gleneagles (2005), in order not to 
weaken Italy’s influence in the international development cooperation arena. 
Scaling up aid will prove exceptionally difficult though, given the diminished 
scope for debt forgiveness, whose incidence on Italy’s total ODA has been 
substantial and increasing over the past decade. In fact, the possibility of 
exploiting debt relief to sustain ODA flows will vanish 2006, as major 
cancellation operations will be concluded. 
A decrease in the share of tied resources would be most desirable to 
enhance the development impact of Italian aid. This would eneble Italy to 
comply with the recommendations of the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness (2005), which called for a reduction of tied aid and better 
alignment with country-specific priorities. 
 Broad resort to multilateral channels is consistent with recognition of 
the organisational and management shortcomings that plague bilateral 
transfers, which have been repeatedly highlighted by the DAC. In view of the 
promised doubling (or tripling) of Italian ODA, and with the prospect of a 
larger share of bilateral aid, reforming the organisation of the bilateral system 
is especially urgent. 
The last DAC Peer Review (2004) pointed to the lack of a clear 
national vision for Italian development policy, saying this might ultimately 
detract from effectiveness. Drawing on the empirical literature, we have 
estimated the determinants of Italian aid, finding that in the past the   19
distribution of resources was significantly shaped by both self interest (foreign 
policy or trade) and by recipients’ needs. The importance of the latter, in 
particular, appears to have strengthened over time. There is room for 
improvement in “aid selectivity”, i.e. the capacity to direct ODA flows to 
“deserving” countries, where better policies and institutions are likely to make 
aid more effective. 
Italian development cooperation is currently undergoing a long-awaited 
process of reform. Our findings strongly suggest the need for a clear 
development strategy focusing primarily on poverty reduction and an 
operational framework that enhances selectivity (hence, effectiveness).   20
Appendix I 
The ITAFPOL dummy variable is based on three sources: the Foreign Affairs 
Ministry’s website, foreign policy documents and independent reviews 
(DAC). The idea was to capture the strategic priorities of Italian foreign policy 
from official statements. In what follows we report a selection of excerpts 
from the above. 
 
Italy’s major development challenges consist in “formulating effective 
programmes in countries with strong political and economic ties to Italy in the 
Mediterranean, Southeastern Europe, and Horn of Africa” regions. 
(DAC Peer Review 2000) 
 
Our country considers Egypt,  Lebanon, and the Palestinian Territories 
priority beneficiaries of interventions on economic reform support, 
modernization, small and medium enterprise development (in particular in the 
primary sector), as well as on education, health and water supply. Regarding 
migrations, after the cooperation agreement for migration flows from Egypt, 
Italy seeks to enhance collaboration with Syria and Lebanon to reach specific 




Priorities on regional security will be set in the following areas: i) the 
Balkans and South-eastern Europe; ii) North Africa/Mediterranean and 
Middle East. Stability in western Balkans represents a strategic priority for 
Italy. 
(Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2007 – “2020 Report, Foreign policy choices”) 
 
In North Africa, Egypt plays a special role – for its size and its traditional 
political activism - as a political and economic reference point for Italy […] 
Another crucial sub-region for Italy is Lebanon, where the Israeli question 
and all other security issues of the Middle East  converge. 
(Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2007 – “2020 Report, Foreign policy choices”) 
 
Relationships with individual Middle-East countries maintain a very high 




Italian engagement for normalization in the bilateral relationship with Libya 
continues. At the same time Italy plans to enhance collaboration in sectors of 
common interest, with special attention to Mediterranean area security issues. 
(http://www.esteri.it/MAE/IT/Politica_Estera/Aree_Geografiche/Mediterr_MO/Rapporti_bilat
erali.htm) 
   21
In those countries (among them Egypt, Libya and Algeria) with which we are 
more closely connected for energy issues, we have to build political, economic 
and commercial links to enhance interdependence; we also have to develop 
investments in these countries in strategic areas, like the financial system, high 
technology, infrastructures and electricity market. 
(Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2007 – “2020 Report, Foreign policy choices”) 
 
 
Geographical, historical, political and cultural reasons confer relationships 




The Italian government, consistently with its engagement in supporting peace-
keeping in the Horn of Africa, seeks to carry on its action for normalization in 
the relationship among those countries. This aims also at consolidating 





Relations with Balkan countries represent a “natural” priority in Italian 
foreign policy--for political tradition, geographical proximity and cultural 
similarity. What happens in that area immediately reflects both on our internal 
security and external relations. 
(http://www.esteri.it/MAE/IT/Politica_Estera/Aree_Geografiche/Europa/Balcani/) 
 
In 2000 Italy, together with Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Greece 
and  Slovenia, signed the Ancona Declaration. It claims that strengthening 
regional cooperation contributes towards promoting political and economic 




“[..] our country already play a strong influence in Middle East, not only for 
the linkages I mentioned above, but also for our equilibrium policy aimed at 
the right for the two peoples to live together in peace and safety[..]” 
 F. Frattini (Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 29 September 2003) 
 
“[..] I mentioned Macedonia and Bosnia because the Balkans clearly reflect 
a strategic interest for Italy [..]” 
“[..] Italy firmly believes in a balanced Europe, which should be focussed on 
its Mediterranean dimension [..]” 
“[..] that is the attention to the stability and development of Balkans and 
Mediterranean area. As you know [..] such issues will represent two real 
priorities [..]” 
 F. Frattini (Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 6 February 2003)   22
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Fig. 2: ODA/GDP
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Fig. 3: Bilateral ODA flows
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Fig. 4: Debt Relief
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Fig. 5: Tied aid
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Fig. 6: ODA to poorest countries
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Fig. 7: Aid for education, health and social infrastructures
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Fig. 8: Administrative costs
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Table 1: Number of times among top ten recipients of Italian aid, by period 
Recipient 1983-90    Recipient 1991-98   Recipient 1999-06 
Mozambique 8    Mozambique  7    Albania  7 
Somalia 8    Albania  5    Ethiopia  6 
Ethiopia 7    Ethiopia  5    Afghanistan 5 
Tunisia 7    Egypt  4    Palestinian  adm.areas  5 
China 6    Argentina  3    Angola  4 
Sudan 4    China  3    China  4 
Tanzania 4    Jordan  3    Eritrea  4 
Argentina 3    Malta  3    Cameroon  3 
Congo Dem.Rep.   3    Morocco  3    Iraq  3 
India 3    Somalia  3    Serbia  3 
Senegal  3              Tunisia  3 Table 2: Estimation results                                              
     (a)  (b)    (c)  (d) 
    
1983-90  1991-98  1999-06  1983-90 1991-98 1999-06  1983-90 1991-98 1999-06  1983-90 1991-98 1999-06 











































































































































































Observations     129  144  145    131 134 134    153 152 154    114 128 129 
of which censored:     21  24  45  30  23  44  42  30  50  16  19  41 
Chi-squared        132.44  117.46  81.13   194.56  101.33  86.19   216.29 125.46  90.71    138.77 122.75  99.11 
Notes: Tobit regression.  *, ** and *** denote rejection of the null hypothesis of the coefficient being equal to 0 at 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively.  
             Standard errors in parenthesis. Table 3: Correlation matrices and summary statistics        
1983-90 
 LNAID  ITAFPOL  LNEXP  LNINC LNLIFEXP DCL  LNMULT LNDIST  LNDAC LNPOP
LNAID 1                 
ITAFPOL 0.09  1                 
LNEXP 0.46  0.32 1               
LNINC -0.49  -0.01  0.20  1             
LNLIFEXP -0.41  0.04  0.17  0.79  1           
DCL -0.01  -0.20  -0.21  0.27  0.30  1      
LNMULT 0.70  -0.08 0.01  -0.48 -0.42  0.14  1       
LNDIST -0.08 -0.52  -0.44  -0.08  -0.03 0.36 0.24  1     
LNDAC 0.70  -0.09  0.21  -0.38  -0.32  0.18  0.92  0.31 1   
LNPOP 0.52  0.12  0.63  -0.29  -0.18  -0.22  0.20  -0.19  0.22  1 
Summary statistics 
Obs 156  155  129  132  151  156  156  155  156  153 
Mean 5.82  0.10  -6.64  8.02  4.10  0.27  8.90  8.60  9.82  8.19 
Std dev.  4.30  0.30  2.32  0.88  0.17  0.44  4.06  0.76  4.24  2.03 
Min 0  0  -17.02  6.23  3.66  0  0  6.20  0  3.69 
Max 12.44  1  -2.33  10.21  4.34  1  14.33  9.78  14.79  13.89 
1991-98 
 LNAID  ITAFPOL  LNEXP  LNINC LNLIFEXP DCL  LNMULT LNDIST  LNDAC LNPOP
LNAID 1                 
ITAFPOL 0.32  1                 
LNEXP 0.22  0.24 1               
LNINC -0.45  -0.03  0.41  1             
LNLIFEXP -0.37  0.08  0.31  0.79  1           
DCL -0.20  -0.21  -0.10  0.31  0.34  1      
LNMULT 0.60  0.15 -0.05  -0.57 -0.44  -0.14  1       
LNDIST -0.24 -0.52  -0.31  0.02 -0.02 0.28  -0.11  1     
LNDAC 0.58 0.13  -0.02  -0.50  -0.35  -0.07  0.65  0.07 1   
LNPOP 0.60  0.12  0.59  -0.31  -0.20  -0.29  0.41  -0.18  0.38  1 
Summary statistics 
Obs. 156  155  145  134  152  156  156  155  156  152 
Mean 6.06  0.10  -6.79  8.04  4.12  0.44  10.18  8.60  10.95  8.34 
Std dev.  3.85  0.30  2.13  0.94  0.19  0.50  2.61  0.76  2.65  2.04 
Min 0  0  -12.27  6.20  3.43  0  0  6.20  0  3.72 
Max 12.11  1  -2.63  10.05  4.37  1  13.85  9.78  14.75  14.00 
1999-2006 
 LNAID  ITAFPOL  LNEXP  LNINC LNLIFEXP DCL  LNMULT LNDIST  LNDAC LNPOP
LNAID 1                 
ITAFPOL 0.33  1                 
LNEXP -0.02  0.23 1               
LNINC -0.61  -0.02  0.41  1             
LNLIFEXP -0.49  0.11  0.34  0.71  1           
DCL -0.21  -0.22  -0.13  0.13  0.15  1      
LNMULT 0.55  0.19 -0.12  -0.68 -0.44  0.06  1       
LNDIST -0.32 -0.52  -0.41  0.00 -0.05 0.21  -0.22  1     
LNDAC 0.50 0.16  -0.09  -0.68  -0.40  0.06  0.81  -0.03  1   
LNPOP 0.37  0.12  0.56  -0.30  -0.18  -0.19  0.47  -0.20  0.47  1 
Summary statistics 
Obs 156  155  146  134  151  156  156  155  156  155 
Mean 4.77  0.10  -6.98  8.15  4.13  0.53  9.74  8.60  10.74  8.39 
Std. dev.  3.94  0.30  2.47  0.97  0.21  0.50  3.50  0.76  3.23  2.12 
Min 0  0  -19.09  6.35  3.62  0  0  6.20  0  3.00 
Max 12.12  1  -2.45  10.21  4.40  1  13.64  9.78  15.32  14.06 Table 4: Data description          
Variable Code  Definition  Source 
Italian aid  AID  Bilateral disbursements by Italy  
(constant 2005 USD, thousands)  DAC-OECD 
Italian foreign policy  ITAFPOL  Dummy variable accounting for countries  
of strategic importance for Italian foreign policy  See Appendix I 
Exports  EXP  Bilateral Italian exports to recipient countries  Direction of Trade Statistics 
(IMF) 
Income per capita  INC  Per capita GDP at purchasing power parities  
(constant 2000 international dollars) 
World Development Indicators 
(World Bank) 
Life expectancy  LIFEXP  Life expectancy at birth (years)  World Development Indicators 
(World Bank) 
Civil liberties  DCL  Dummy variable given by regrouping Civil Liberty index  Freedom House (2007) 
Multilateral aid  MULT  Aggregate disbursements by multilateral institutions 
(constant 2005 USD, thousands)  DAC-OECD 
Geographical distance  DIST  Recipient country's distance from Italy (Km)  Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et 
d’Informations Internationales - CEPII  
Other DAC donors' aid  DAC  Aggregate bilateral disbursements by DAC donors, excluding 
Italy (constant 2005 USD, thousands)  DAC-OECD 
Population POP  Population  (thousands)  World Development Indicators 
(World Bank) 
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